We produce a decidable super-intuitionistic normal modal logic of internalised intuitionistic (and thus disjunctive and monotonic) interactive proofs (LIiP) from an existing classical counterpart of classical monotonic non-disjunctive interactive proofs (LiP). Intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a durable epistemic impact in the possibly adversarial communication medium CM (which is imagined as a distinguished agent) and only in that, that consists in the permanent induction of the perfect and thus disjunctive knowledge of their proof goal by means of CM's knowledge of the proof: If CM knew my proof then CM would persistently and also disjunctively know that my proof goal is true. So intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a lasting transfer of disjunctive propositional knowledge (disjunctively knowable facts) in the communication medium of multi-agent distributed systems via the transmission of certain individual knowledge (knowable intuitionistic proofs). Our (necessarily) CM-centred notion of proof is also a disjunctive explicit refinement of KD45-belief, and yields also such a refinement of standard S5-knowledge. Monotonicity but not communality is a commonality of LiP, LIiP, and their internalised notions of proof. As a side-effect, we offer a short internalised proof of the Disjunction Property of Intuitionistic Logic (originally proved by Gödel).
Introduction
Subject matter The subject matter of this paper is normal modal logic of internalised monotonic interactive proofs, i.e., a novel super-intuitionistic nor- * Work partially funded with Grant AFR 894328 from the National Research Fund Luxembourg cofunded under the Marie-Curie Actions of the European Commission (FP7-COFUND) [Kra13a] . mal modal logic of internalised intuitionistic (and thus disjunctive and monotonic) interactive proofs (LIiP) as well as an existing classical normal modal logic of internalised classical monotonic (and thus non-disjunctive) interactive proofs (LiP) [Kra12a, Kra13c] . (We abbreviate interactivity-related adjectives with lower-case letters.) Recall from [Mos10] that a super-intuitionistic propositional logic is any consistent collection of propositional formulas that contains all the axioms of Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (IL) and that is closed under modus ponens and substitution of arbitrary formulas for proposition letters. Note however that the language of IL is a strict subset of the (propositionally modal) language of LIiP.
Goal Our goal here is to produce LIiP axiomatically as well as semantically from LiP. The process of constructing LIiP from LiP is presented for the sake of gaining insight into the semantic connection between intuitionistic and classical interactive proofs, respectively. LIiP, the result of the construction, however is independent of LiP. Further note that like in [Kra12a] , [Kra12c, Kra13c] , and [Kra12b, Kra13b] , we still understand interactive proofs as sufficient evidence for intended resource-unbounded proof-checking agents (who are though unable to guess), and leave probabilistic and polynomial-time resource bounded agents for future work. Finally note that we choose our meta-logic to be classical (singleton meta-universe or meta-world unicity, cf. Section 1.1.1).
Motivation
Our immediate motivation for LIiP is to complete the picture of our abovementioned resource-unbounded propositional normal modal logics of interactive proofs with the missing variant of intuitionistic interactive proofs-see Table 1 . The overarching motivation for LIiP is to serve in an intuitionistic foundation of interactive computation. See [Kra12a] for a programmatic motivation. Table 1 displays characteristic properties of our interactive proofs as internalised in their respective resource-unbounded propositional normal modal logic together with typical applications in information security. The logics themselves, in contrast to their internalised proof terms, except LIiP are classical, i.e., monotonic and non-disjunctive (and thus negation-incomplete). As a confirmation, notice that disjunctivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for intuitionism.
We recall and explain all this logical terminology in the next subsections, and thereby draw some inspiration from the quite different intuitionistic logic of intuitionistic non-interactive proofs [AI07] and from the informational views on modal and intuitionistic logic expressed in [vB97, vB09] .
Intuitionistic Logic (IL)
Definition From [Mos10] , recall that Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (IL) can be succinctly described as Classical Propositional Logic without the Aristotelian law of excluded middle (LEM): (A ∨ ¬A), but with the law of contradiction (¬A → (A → B)), and that intuitionistically, Reductio ad absurdum Table 2 ). Therein,
• the valuation function on atomic propositions is constrained to be monotonic with respect to a partial order on system states (possible worlds);
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• the positive intuitionistic connectives (conjunction, disjunction) are interpreted as their classical counterparts (which conserve the monotonicity of atomic propositions) on the current state;
• the negative intuitionistic connectives (negation, implication) are interpreted as their non-monotonic classical counterparts on the upset of the current state with respect to the partial order (and thus are made to conserve the monotonicity of atomic propositions).
Hence first, intuitionistic negation and implication can be viewed as classical negation and implication prefixed by a (unary) modality that is interpreted by a (binary) partial-order accessibility relation (e.g., a temporal reachability relation), respectively; and second, intuitionistic facts, be they positive or negative, are necessarily monotonic (durable, forward invariant, lasting, persistent, stable) in the state space [vB09] . (Intuitionistic double negation can be interpreted temporally as the forward invariant "at some future time.") Plain classical logic is also but trivially monotonic, as it can be viewed as a modal logic over a singleton state space. From this modal viewpoint, one immediately recognises why (¬¬A → A) ("true at some future time implies true now") is valid classically.
Properties
In the previous paragraph, we saw that IL has the monotonicity property ("intuitionistic implies monotonic"). IL has also the important disjunction property ("intuitionistic implies disjunctive"). That is, any external intuitionistic notion of proof I has the property that I A ∨ B implies I A or
Recall that disjunctivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for intuitionism, and that plain classical notions of proof do not have the disjunction property. Now note that when internalised in an object-logical language,
• an external intuitionistic notion of proof, say I1 , becomes a unary necessity modality, say [M ], parametrised with a proof term M ;
• the disjunction property of I1 becomes a disjunctive property of the internalising external notion of proof, say
1 Incidentally, this monotonicity makes intuitionistic logic incompatible with hybrid logic, whose nominals are atomic propositions true at a single state [AtC07] , at least in the basic case where the intuitionistic-logical universe of worlds coincides with the hybrid-logical one. For more complex cases, see for example the work of Torben Braüner and Valeria de Paiva.
• the monotonicity property becomes the similar property that Properties From the detailed reminder in Section 1.1.1 of [Kra12b, Kra13b] , recall that first, the negation-completeness property implies the discussed disjunction property ("negation-complete implies disjunctive"); second, any internalised negation-complete notion of proof 2 is non-monotonic, that is,
φ ("negation-complete implies nonmonotonic"); third, negation completeness and intuitionism are incompatible properties; and fourth, negation completeness implies algorithmic decidability.
Communality
In LDiiP, LiiP, LiP, and LIiP, our so-far ad hoc modal notation [M ]φ becomes M a φ , M ::
C a φ , and M ± CM φ , respectively, where a and C is an additional parameter for a peer-reviewing agent a (such as the as-an-agent-imagined communication medium CM) and a finite agent-community C of peers, respectively. The intended meaning of these modalities is "M can classically and disjunctively but only non-monotonically prove to a that φ [is true]," "M can classically and non-monotonically prove to a that φ and this fact is common belief in C ∪ {a}," "M can classically and monotonically prove to a that φ and this fact is common knowledge in C ∪ {a}," and "M can intuitionistically (and thus disjunctively and monotonically) prove to CM that φ," respectively. (Recall from [FHMV95, MV07] , that knowledge implies belief.) In all these logics, the proof potential is such that if my peer reviewer knew my proof then she would know that its proof goal is true. Notice that what is accepted as a potential proof M may depend on a community C ∪ {a} of peers if and only if the proof is non-disjunctive. This is the (non-)communality of M mentioned in Table 1 .
Contribution
Our contribution in this paper is five-fold: That is, we put forward LIiP as a modal-logical characterisation of the concept of message-passing communication medium.
2. We provide a standard but also oracle-computational and set-theoretically constructive Kripke-semantics for LIiP (cf. Section 2.2):
• Like in [Kra12c, Kra13c] and [Kra12b, Kra13b] , we endow the proof modality with a standard Kripke-semantics [BvB07] , but first define its accessibility relation M R CM constructively in terms of elementary set-theoretic constructions, 3 namely as M R CM (cf. Section 2.2.1), and then match it to an abstract semantic interface in standard form (which abstractly stipulates the characteristic properties of the accessibility relation [Fit07] ). We will say that M R CM exemplifies (or realises) M R CM (cf. Section 2.2.2). (A simple example of a settheoretically constructive but non-intuitionistic definition of a modal accessibility is the well-known definition of epistemic accessibility as state indistinguishability defined in terms of equality of stateprojection functions [FHMV95] .)
• Our Kripke-semantics is oracle-computational in the sense that the individual proof knowledge (say M ) can be thought of as being provided by a computation oracle (cf. Definition 3), which thus acts as a hypothetical provider and imaginary epistemic source of our interactive proofs.
As notable semantic novelties in intuitionistic modal logic, LIiP is: 3. We prove a modal-depth result applying both to LIiP's necessity as well as its corresponding possibility modality (cf. Corollary 3).
4. We prove that our CM-centred notion of proof is also a disjunctive explicit refinement of standard KD45-belief, and yields also such a refinement of standard S5-knowledge and S4-provability (cf. Corollary 5 and 6).
5. We prove the finite-model property (cf. Theorem 4) and therefrom the algorithmic decidability of LIiP (cf. Corollary 7).
As a side-effect of our work on LIiP, we offer an internalised, three-line two-axiom proof of the Disjunction Property of Intuitionistic Logic (IL) originally proved by Gödel. The two axioms are modal internalisations of two fundamental properties of IL, namely the truthfulness of its proofs and Kripke's Monotonicity Lemma for his semantics of IL. Surprisingly, they jointly trivialise the corresponding box modality ' ' (though not the one of LIiP) in a technical sense, and thus also, in a non-technical sense, Gödel's (non-trivial) proof of IL's Disjunction Property. The truthfulness of intuitionistic proofs corresponds to the well-known modal T-law φ → φ and Kripke's Monotonicity Lemma to the law φ → φ (not to be confused with the mentioned monotonicity of proof terms, cf. Page 4 and Remark 1). Jointly, they imply (φ ∨ ϕ) → ( φ ∨ ϕ) in any modal logic:
Roadmap
In the next section, we introduce our Logic of Intuitionistic interactive Proofs (LIiP) axiomatically by means of a compact closure operator that induces the Hilbert-style proof system that we seek. We then prove a substantial number of useful, deducible structural and logical laws (cf. Theorem 1 and 2) within the obtained system, and therefrom important corollaries (Corollary 2-6), some of which count as our aforementioned contributions in this paper. Next, we introduce the concretely constructed semantics as well as the standard abstract semantic interface for LIiP (cf. Section 2.2), and prove the axiomatic adequacy of the proof system with respect to this interface (cf. Theorem 3). In the construction of the semantics, we again make use of a closure operator, but this time on sets of proof terms. Finally, we prove the finite-model property (cf. Theorem 4) and the algorithmic decidability (cf. Corollary 7) of LDiiP.
LIiP 2.1 Syntactically
The Logic of Intuitionistic interactive Proofs (LIiP) provides a modal formula language over a generic message term language. The formula language offers the propositional constructors, a relational symbol ' k ' for constructing atomic propositions about so-called individual knowledge (e.g., a k M ), and a modal constructor ' ± ' for propositions about proofs (e.g., M ± CM φ). The message language offers a term constructor for message pairing and can accommodate arbitrary other term constructors, e.g., for cryptography (cf. [Kra12a] ). The single term constructor of pairing is sufficient for internalising modus ponens into the message language (cf. Theorem 2.1) and thus for internalising the single deduction rule of intuitionistic logic into it. Modus ponens can be regarded as a minimal requirement for a system to count as a proof system. And so in the context of LIiP, all other term constructors can be regarded as application-specific, and LIiP-theories with such constructors as applied LIiP-theories. These however are not the subject matter of our present paper about basic (or pure) LIiP.
(Message signing has no essential role in LIiP as opposed to LiP.) In brief, LIiP is a minimal modular extension of IL with an interactively generalised additional operator (the proof modality) and proof-term language (only one, binary built-in constructor; agents as proof-checkers). Alternatively, LIiP can be viewed as a refinement (due to its parameterised modality) and extension (due to additional laws) of Fischer Servi's [Fis84] or, equivalently, Plotkin and Stirling's [PS86] basic intuitionistic modal logic IK, promoted in [Sim94] as "the true intuitionistic analogue of K." See [dPR11] for a recent discussion of this purported truth and alternative contribution in the form of the so-called basic constructive modal logic CK, which can be embedded into IK [Ran10] . Note that the formula language of LIiP is identical to the one of LiP [Kra12a] modulo the term language and the proof-modality notation. The term language of LIiP is strictly included in the term language of LiP but may be arbitrarily extended.
The proof-modality notation in LIiP is ' ± ' whereas it is ' : ' in LiP.
In the sequel, grey-shading indicates essential differences to LiP.
Definition 1 (The language of LIiP). Let
• A designate a finite set of agent names a, b, c, etc. such that CM ∈ A, where CM designates the communication medium (admissible also in LiP);
• M M ::= a B (M, M ) designate our language of message terms M over A with (transmittable) agent names a ∈ A, application-specific data B (left blank here), and message-term pairs (M, M ) ;
(Messages must be grammatically well-formed, which yields an induction principle. So agent names a are logical term constants, the meta-variable B just signals the possibility of an extended term language M, and (·, ·) is a binary functional symbol. For other term constructors, see [Kra12a] .)
• P designate a denumerable set of propositional variables P constrained such that for all a ∈ A and M ∈ M, (a k M ) ∈ P (for "a knows M ") is a distinguished variable, i.e., an atomic proposition, (for individual knowledge); (So, for a ∈ A, a k · is a unary relational symbol.)
• L φ ::= P φ∧φ φ∨φ ¬φ φ → φ M ± CM φ designate our language of logical formulas φ, where the modal-necessity formula M ± CM φ reads as "M can intuitionistically prove that φ (is true) to CM."
Note the following macro-definitions:
(double negation as modal possibility rather than necessity, unlike in [Doš84] ; see also Theorem 2.58). Recall that whereas conjunction and disjunction connectives as well as necessitation and possibility modalities are dually inter-definable in classical modal logic by means of negation, they are not necessarily so in intuitionistic modal logic [Sim94, Requirement 5]. However, as our above macro-definition of M ∓ CM φ in terms of a double negation and individual knowledge foreshadows, M ∓ CM φ fortunately is not necessary as a primitive modality in the language of LIiP. ([AI07] remain silent as to the dual of their intuitionistic-proof modality.)
Then, LIiP has the following axiom and deduction-rule schemas.
Definition 2 (The axioms and deduction rules of LIiP). Let
• Γ 0 designate an adequate set of axioms for intuitionistic propositional logic
designate a set of axiom schemas.
We call LIiP a base theory, and Cl(Γ) an LIiP-theory for any Γ ⊆ L.
Notice the logical order of LIiP, which like LiP's is, due to propositions about (proofs of) propositions, higher-order propositional.
Inherited laws From LiP [Kra12a] , we recall the discussion of the (un)pairing axiom, Kripke's law (K), the laws of epistemic T (ET) and epistemic antitonicity (EA): We assume the existence of a pairing mechanism modelling finite sets. Such a mechanism is required by the important application of communication (not only cryptographic) protocols [And08, Chapter 3] , in which concatenation of high-level data packets is associative, commutative, and idempotent. The key to the validity of K is that we understand interactive proofs as sufficient evidence for intended resource-unbounded proof-checking agents (who are though still unable to guess). Clearly for such agents, if M is sufficient evidence for φ → φ and φ then so is M for φ . Then, the significance of ET (which as opposed to the standard T-law is conditioned on individual knowledge) to interactivity is that in truly distributed multi-agent systems, not all proofs are known by all agents, i.e., agents are not omniscient with respect to messages. Otherwise, why communicate with each other? So there being a proof does not imply knowledge of that proof. When an agent a does not know the proof and the agent cannot generate the proof ex nihilo herself by guessing it, only communication from a peer, who thus acts as an oracle, can entail the knowledge of the proof with a. Finally, note that the law of self-knowledge is a theorem but not an axiom in LiP, and observe that EA is a rule of logical modularity that allows the modular generation of structural modal laws from implication term laws (cf. Theorem 1).
New laws We continue to discuss the new laws of LIiP, which are all axiom schemas: In contrast to LiP [Kra12a] , LIiP must have an intuitionistic rather than a classical propositional axiom base Γ 0 as already explained at the end of Section 1.1.1. Next, ID says that intuitionistic necessity ("box") implies intuitionistic possibility ("diamond"). As opposed to its classical-modal-logic equivalent D, ID cannot be alternatively stated in the shape of φ → ¬ ¬φ. Then, the law of modal monotonicity MM reflects the semantic fact mentioned in Section 1.2 that LIiP's Kripke-model absorbs the partial order for the Kripkesemantics of LIiP's intuitionistic connectives as a mere instance of the accessibility relation for the Kripke-semantics of LIiP's proof modality, thanks to being parametric (and thus generic, cf. Section 2.2). Thus we adopt formulas of the shape φ → φ as axioms MM in our intuitionistic modal logical system LIiP, like Došen in his intuitionistic modal logical system Hdn [Doš84] , where he adopts formulas of that form as axioms dn2. To our knowledge, Hdn and LIiP are the only intuitionistic modal logics with such axioms. Finally, we could add admissible but not derivable rules and their corresponding internalising axioms to LIiP in the style of [AI07] . (Recall from [Mos10] that the admissible rules of a theory are the rules under which the theory is closed. Hence the set of primitive and derivable rules is a subset of the set of admissible rules, and [but not] vice versa in classical [intuitionistic] logic. [IL is structurally incomplete.] See [Jeř08] for suitable bases of admissible rules.) However, since the addition of admissible but not derivable rules to a theory does not change the theory, such an addition can be considered as unnecessary, at least in our base theory.
In the sequel, ":iff" abbreviates "by definition, if and only if".
Proposition 1 (Hilbert-style proof system). Let
In other words, LIiP ⊆ 2 L × L is a system of closure conditions in the sense of [Tay99, Definition 3.7.4]. For example:
1. for all axioms φ ∈ Γ 1 , LIiP φ 2. for modus ponens, {φ, φ → φ } LIiP φ 3. for epistemic antitonicity,
(In the space-saving, horizontal Hilbert-notation "Φ LIiP φ", Φ is not a set of hypotheses but a set of premises, cf. modus ponens and epistemic antitonicity.)
Then, LIiP can be viewed as being defined by a Cl-induced Hilbert-style proof system. In fact Cl : 2 L → 2 L is a standard consequence operator, i.e., a substitution-invariant compact closure operator.
Proof. Like in [Kra12a] . That a Hilbert-style proof system can be viewed as induced by a compact closure operator is well-known (e.g., see [Gab95] ); that Cl is indeed such an operator can be verified by inspection of the inductive definition of Cl; and substitution invariance follows from our definitional use of axiom schemas. 4 Corollary 1 (Normality). LIiP is a normal modal logic.
Proof. Jointly by Kripke's law and modus ponens (by definition), necessitation (cf. proof of Theorem 2.0), and substitution invariance (cf. Proposition 1).
We are now going to present some useful deducible structural laws of LIiP, including the deducible non-structural rule of epistemic bitonicity, used in the deduction of some of them. Here, "structural" means "deducible exclusively from term axioms." The laws are enumerated in a (total) order that respects (but cannot reflect) their respective proof prerequisites. The laws are also deducible in LiP, in the same order and without non-intuitionistic machinery [Kra12a] .
Theorem 1 (Some useful deducible structural laws).
Proof. Like in [Kra12a] -no non-intuitionistic machinery is required.
For a discussion of these LIiP laws, consider our discussion of their analogs in LiP [Kra12a] and the following remark.
Remark 1 (Monotonicity-Proof & Truth). The law of proof extension captures the monotonicity of the proof terms in LIiP mentioned in Table 1 , as does its analog in LiP. In contrast, the law of modal monotonicity (cf. Definition 2), which does not hold in LiP, captures the monotonicity of the local truths in LIiP. Recall from Section 1 that in an intuitionistic (modal) universe (such as LIiP's), all, i.e., positive or negative (whence the notation ' ± CM '), (local) truths are monotonic. Whereas in a classical (modal) universe (such as LiP's), not all (local) truths need be monotonic. If a proof term is monotonic then its proof goal is. If a proof goal is monotonic then its proof must be. In LIiP, all proof goals are monotonic, thanks to LIiP being intuitionistic, which is what forces them to be so. However in LiP, not all proof goals need be monotonic, because of LiP being classical as well as modal, which is what frees them from being so.
Corollary 2 (S-combinator property).
Proof. Like in [Kra12a]-again, no non-intuitionistic machinery is required.
We are going to present also some useful, deducible logical laws of LIiP. Here, "logical" means "not structural" in the previously defined sense. Also these laws are enumerated in an order that respects their respective proof prerequisites. Grey-shading indicates special interest for intuitionistic modal logic in general and for LIiP as opposed to (the classical) LiP in particular. Three important themes therein are: first, intuitionistic negation (single '¬' and double '¬¬') and second, individual knowledge (CM k M ), and their import for the relation between M ± CM φ and its dual M ∓ CM φ, which is normally not one of identity nor dual definability in intuitionistic modal logic; and third, the internalised disjunction property (IDP), which does not hold in LiP. ([AI07] remain silent about the deducibility of an IDP in their logic, which, given that they internalise standard IL, is intriguing.) Theorem 2 has four important corollaries, among which there is a modal-depth result, the relation of LIiP to Fischer Servi's [Fis84] and Plotkin and Stirling's [PS86] seminal work on intuitionistic modal logic, and the relation of LIiP to standard doxastic [MV07] and epistemic logic [MV07, FHMV95, HR10] . The number of intermediate results required to obtain the corollaries, reflected in the length of Theorem 2, may be indicative of the exponential blow-up in proof length of intuitionistic over classical logic [Hru07] . The non-intuitionistically inclined reader may want to skip them except Theorem 2.58. Whereas the intuitionistically inclined reader may want to prove them herself, in order and as milestones for proving their corollaries.
Theorem 2 (Some useful deducible logical laws).
6. LIiP M ± CM (anything can prove tautological truth)
(local classicality implies modal equivalence, LCIME)
(proof knowledge implies modal equivalence, PKIME)
24. LIiP ¬(M ± CM ⊥) (nothing can prove tautological falsehood)
58.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The following remark flags a non-trivial insight, also explicated in Section 2.2.
Remark 2 (Intuitionistic truths). Theorem 2.8 means that in interactive settings, the intuitionistic truths are those of the communication medium.
The reader is invited to compare Theorem 2.8 to its global counterpart Theorem 2.27, whose analog also holds in LiP but was not stated there.
1. only occurrences of the 'M ± CM '-modality then
2. at least one occurrence of the 'M ∓ CM '-modality then
Proof. For 1, apply MI. For 2, apply MI, MI bis, MMI, and MMI bis.
Corollary 4 (Intuitionistic Modal Logic).
LIiP is a refinement (due to its parameterised modality) and extension (due to additional laws) of Fischer Servi's The following corollary asserts that our disjunctive proof modality is also an explicit refinement of the standard (implicit) belief modality [MV07] .
Corollary 5 (Disjunctive Explicit Belief). 'M ± CM ·' is a disjunctive KD45-modality of explicit agent belief, where M represents the explicit evidence term that can justify the agent CM's belief. Additionally, the communication medium CM is a truth-believing agent in the sense that LIiP φ → M ± CM φ.
Proof. Consider that 'M ± CM ·' satisfies the K-law (cf. Definition 2), the D-law (called ID in Definition 2), the 4-law (cf. Theorem 2.30), the 5-law (cf. Theorem 2.31), IDP self-proof (cf. Theorem 2.41), the MM-law (cf. Definition 2), and the N-law (cf. Theorem 2.0).
Thanks to Theorem 2.10, CM k M is a sufficient condition for 'M ± CM ·' to behave like a standard S5-modality of perfect knowledge (in a technical sense) [MV07, FHMV95, HR10] , which in addition to being a KD45-modality not only obeys the D-law but also the stronger T-law (knowledge, not only belief) and the MM-law (perfect knowledge):
Remark 3 (Perfect knowledge). In interactive settings, only the communication medium CM, through which all messages have to pass, can attain perfect knowledge (the other agents having only partial visibility of the network, cf. Definition 3). However note that LIiP being propositionally modal-intuitionistic, this perfect knowledge is of propositional invariants of the communication network only (cf. Page 4). So the epistemic perfection of the communication medium is only within a certain grain (propositional) and scope (invariants).
In the following corollary, we construct also a disjunctive explicit refinement of (implicit) S4-provability. 
Corollary 6 (Disjunctive Explicit Provability
). ' CM k M ∧M ± CM ·' is a disjunc-(CM k M ∧ M ± CM (φ ∨ φ )) → ((CM k M ∧ M ± CM φ) ∨ (CM k M ∧ M ± CM φ )) by inspecting Theorem 2.40.
Semantically
We continue to present the concretely constructed semantics as well as the standard abstract semantic interface for LIiP, and prove the axiomatic adequacy of the proof system with respect to this interface. The core ingredient of the concrete semantics of LIiP are so-called input histories, which were introduced in [Kra12b, Kra13b] and could also be used in an even more concrete semantics of LiP. Input histories are finite words of input events and serve as concrete states s ∈ S in the state space S, on which the concrete and abstract accessibility relation M R CM ⊆ S × S and M R CM ⊆ S × S for LIiP is defined, respectively. The reader of [Kra12a, Kra13c] will recognise similar but simpler definitions here; the one of M R CM could be even simpler (cf. Fact 1.2), but is as now in order to allow for a simpler, pattern-matching comparison with the corresponding one in [Kra12a, Kra13c] . (We wanted to show how to produce LIiP from LiP.) • msgs a := msgs • π a designate (local) raw-data extraction by a ;
• cl 
(cl s a (∅) can be viewed as a's individual-knowledge base in s. For applicationspecific terms such as signing and encryption, we would have to add here the closure conditions corresponding to their characteristic term axioms.)
• a ⊆ S × S designate the (local) state pre-order of a such that for all s, s ∈ S, s a s :iff there is s ∈ S such that π a (s) π a (s ) = π a (s ) ;
• := CM designate the (global) state partial order serving as the concrete accessibility relation in the Kripke-semantics for the I-fragment of LIiP;
( is partial thanks to CM seeing any agent's input events.)
• ≡ a := a ∩ ( a ) −1 designate the (local) state equivalence of a;
• M R CM ⊆ S × S designate the concretely constructed accessibility relation-short, concrete accessibility-for LIiP such that for all s, s ∈ S,
[s] ≡CM (iff there iss ∈ S s.t. s CMs and M ∈ cls CM (∅) ands ≡ CM s ).
Note that the data-mining operator cl a : 2 M → 2 M is a compact closure operator, which induces a data-derivation relation a ⊆ 2 M × M such that D a M :iff M ∈ cl a (D), which (1) has the compactness and (2) 
We need the following auxiliary definition for the proposition following it.
Definition 4 (Message pre-ordering [Kra12a, Kra13c] ).
•
Notice the definitional overloading of the notation a , i.e., once as a ⊆ S × S in Definition 3 and once as a ⊆ M × M in the previous Definition 4.
Proposition 2 (Concrete accessibility). 
Proof. Note that "MIAR" stands for "modal-intuitionistic-accessibility-relation."
Abstractly
Definition 5 (Kripke-model). We define the satisfaction relation |= for LIiP in Table 2 , where
S designates a usual valuation function, yet -partially predefined such that for all a ∈ A and M ∈ M,
(If agents are Turing-machines then a knowing M can be understood as a being able to parse M on its tape.)
-constrained such that for all s, s ∈ S, if s ∈ V(P ) and s s then s ∈ V(P ) ;
(following Kripke's semantics for IL)
designates an intuitionistic modal frame for LIiP with a usual partial order ⊆ S × S for the intuitionistic part as well as an abstractly constrained accessibility relation-short, abstract accessibility-M R CM ⊆ S × S for LIiP such that-the semantic interface:
Looking back, we recognise that Proposition 2 actually establishes the important fact that our concrete accessibility M R CM in Definition 3 realises all the properties stipulated by our abstract accessibility M R CM in Definition 5; we say that
Further, observe that LIiP (like LiP) has a Herbrand-style semantics, i.e., logical constants (agent names) and functional symbols (pairing) are self-interpreted rather than interpreted in terms of (other, semantic) constants and functions. This simplifying design choice spares our framework from the additional complexity that would arise from term-variable assignments [BG07] , which in turn keeps our models propositionally modal. Our choice is admissible because our individuals (messages) are finite. (Infinitely long "messages" are non-messages; they can never be completely received, e.g., transmitting irrational numbers as such is impossible.)
• The formula φ ∈ L is true (or satisfied ) in the model (S, V) at the state s ∈ S :iff (S, V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is satisfiable in the model (S, V) :iff there is s ∈ S such that (S, V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is globally true (or globally satisfied ) in the model (S, V), written (S, V) |= φ, :iff for all s ∈ S, (S, V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is satisfiable :iff there is a model (S, V) and a state s ∈ S such that (S, V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is valid, written |= φ, :iff for all models (S, V), (S, V) |= φ.
The following lemma is a passage obligé in the construction of a Kripke-semantics for any intuitionistic logic, modal or not, and thus also for ours.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity Lemma). For all LIiP-models (S, V), s, s ∈ S, and φ ∈ L, if s s and (S, V), s |= φ then (S, V), s |= φ.
Proof. Let (S, V) designate an arbitrary LIiP-model and let s, s ∈ S. Then let us proceed by induction on the structure of φ ∈ L :
• Base case (φ := P for an arbitrary P ∈ P ⊆ L). Suppose that s s and (S, V), s |= P . Thus s ∈ V(P ), by definition. Hence s ∈ V(P ), by the definitional constraint on V. Thus (S, V), s |= P , by definition.
• Inductive steps: Proposition 4 (Admissibility of LIiP-specific axioms and rules).
Proof. 1 and 2 are immediate; 4 and 8 hold by the fact that LIiP has a standard Kripke-semantics; 3 follows directly from the epistemic-image property of M R CM , 5 from the conditional reflexivity of M R CM , and 9 from the proof-monotonicity property of M R CM . 6 follows from the seriality of M R CM and the MIAR-inclusion and the epistemic-image property of M R CM as follows: Let (S, V) designate an arbitrary LIiP-model and let s ∈ S. Further let s ∈ S and suppose that s s . Now suppose that (S, V), s |= M ± CM φ. Further let s ∈ S and suppose that s s . Hence (S, V), s |= M ± CM φ by the Monotonicity Lemma. That is, for all s ∈ S, if s M R CM s then (S, V), s |= φ. But by the seriality of M R CM , there is indeed an s ∈ S such that s M R CM s . Hence, (S, V), s |= φ, and also s s by the MIAR-inclusion property, and yet also M ∈ cl
follows from the MIAR-inclusion property of M R CM and the Monotonicity Lemma (which in turn holds thanks to the special transitivity and the MIAR-inclusion property of M R CM ) as follows: Let (S, V) designate an arbitrary LIiP-model and let s ∈ S. Further let s ∈ S and suppose that s s . Now suppose that (S, V), s |= φ. Additionally, let s ∈ S and suppose that s M R CM s . Hence s s by MIAR-inclusion. Hence (S, V), s |= φ by the Monotonicity Lemma. Thus, (S, V), s |= M ± CM φ, and then (S, V), s |= φ → M ± CM φ.
Theorem 3 (Axiomatic adequacy).
LIiP is adequate for |=, i.e.,:
Proof. Both parts can be proved with standard means: axiomatic soundness follows from the admissibility of the axioms and rules (cf. Propostion 4) as usual, and semantic completeness follows by means of a construction of canonical models that is appropriate for intuitionistic normal modal logic as follows. Let
• W designate the set of all prime LIiP-consistent sets
5 * A set W of LIiP-formulas is prime LIiP-consistent :iff W is LIiP-consistent and W is prime. A set W of LIiP-formulas is LIiP-consistent :iff W is not LIiP-inconsistent. A set W of LIiP-formulas is LIiP-inconsistent :iff there is a finite W ⊆ W such that (( W ) → ⊥) ∈ LIiP. A set W of LIiP-formulas is prime :iff first, W is deductively closed, that is, there is a finite W ⊆ W such that for all φ ∈ L, if (( W ) → φ) ∈ LIiP then φ ∈ W , and second, W has the disjunction property, that is, for all φ, φ ∈ L, if φ ∨ φ ∈ W then φ ∈ W or φ ∈ W . Similar to a classical Lindenbaum construction (extending consistent sets to maximal consistent sets) any LIiP-consistent set can be extended to a prime LIiP-consistent set.
• for all w ∈ W, w ∈ V C (P ) :iff P ∈ w.
Following standard practice common to all intuitionistic normal modal logics, the following useful property of M C , the so-called Truth Lemma, for all φ ∈ L and w ∈ W, φ ∈ w if and only if M C , w |= φ can be proved by induction on the structure of φ. With this lemma, it can then be proved that for all φ ∈ L, if LIiP φ then |= φ. Let φ ∈ L, and suppose that LIiP φ. Thus, {¬φ} is LIiP-consistent, and can be extended to a prime LIiP-consistent set w, i.e., ¬φ ∈ w ∈ W. Hence M C , w |= ¬φ, by the Truth Lemma. Thus: M C , w |= φ, M C |= φ, and |= φ. That is, M C is a universal (for all φ ∈ L) counter-model (if φ is a non-theorem then M C falsifies φ).
The only proof obligation specific to the semantic-completeness proof for LIiP is to prove that M C is also an LIiP-model. So let us instantiate our datamining operator cl a (cf. Page 19) on W by letting for all w ∈ W msgs a (w) := { M | a k M ∈ w }, and let us prove that:
For (1), let w, w ∈ W and suppose that w M C CM w . That is, for all φ ∈ L, if M ± CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w . Since w is deductively closed,
For (2), let w ∈ W and suppose that M ∈ cl w CM (∅). Hence CM k M ∈ w due to the deductive closure of w. Further suppose that M ± CM φ ∈ w. Since w is deductively closed,
Hence, CM k M → φ ∈ w, and φ ∈ w, by consecutive modus ponens.
For (3), let w ∈ W and φ ∈ L, and suppose that M ± CM φ ∈ w. Since w is deductively closed,
Hence, M ∓ CM φ ∈ w by modus ponens. That is, ¬¬(CM k M ∧ φ) ∈ w by definition. Since w is deductively closed, ¬¬(CM k M ∧φ) → ¬¬φ ∈ w. Hence ¬¬φ ∈ w by modus ponens. Hence M C , w |= ¬¬φ by the Truth Lemma. Hence for all w ∈ W, if w w then there is w ∈ W such that w w and M C , w |= φ by definition. Hence φ ∈ w by the Truth Lemma.
For (4), let us first prove that CM C CM = . So let w, w ∈ W and suppose that w CM C CM w . That is, for all φ ∈ L, if CM ± CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w . Further let φ ∈ L and suppose that φ ∈ w. Hence if CM ± CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w . Since w is deductively closed,
Hence CM ± CM φ ∈ w by LIiP-modus ponens. Hence φ ∈ w by meta-level modus ponens. Thus w ⊆ w , and then w w . Conversely, suppose that w w . That is, w ⊆ w . Further let φ ∈ L and suppose that CM ± CM φ ∈ w. Hence CM ± CM φ ∈ w . Since w is deductively closed,
Hence φ ∈ w by LIiP-modus ponens. Second, let us prove that M C CM ⊆ CM C CM . So let w, w ∈ W and suppose that w M C CM w . That is, for all φ ∈ L, if M ± CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w . Further let φ ∈ L and suppose that CM ± CM φ ∈ w. Since w is deductively closed,
Hence φ ∈ w by LIiP-modus ponens. Since w is deductively closed,
Hence M ± CM φ ∈ w by LIiP-modus ponens. Hence φ ∈ w by meta-level modus ponens.
For (5), let w, w ∈ W and suppose that w ( CM C CM • M C CM ) w . That is, there is w ∈ W such that w CM C CM w and w M C CM w . Thus, (for all φ ∈ L, if CM ± CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w ) and (for all φ ∈ L, if M ± CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w ). Further let φ ∈ L and suppose that M ± CM φ ∈ w. Since w is deductively closed,
Hence (CM ± CM (M ± CM φ)) ∈ w. Hence M ± CM φ ∈ w by the first hypothesis. Hence φ ∈ w by the second hypothesis. Thus w M C CM w .
For (6) , suppose that M CM M . That is, for all w ∈ W, if M ∈ cl w CM (∅) then M ∈ cl w CM (∅). Hence for all w ∈ W, if CM k M ∈ w then CM k M ∈ w due to the deductive closure of w, which contains all the term axioms corresponding to the defining clauses of cl w CM . Hence for all w ∈ W, if M C , w |= CM k M then M C , w |= CM k M , by the Truth Lemma. Hence also, for all w ∈ W, M C , w |= CM k M → CM k M by the definition of . Hence for all w ∈ W, CM k M → CM k M ∈ w by the Truth Lemma. Hence the following intermediate result, called IR, for all w ∈ W and φ ∈ L, (M ± CM φ) → M ± CM φ ∈ w, by EA. Now, let w, w ∈ W and suppose that w M C CM w . That is, for all φ ∈ L, if M ± CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w . Hence, for all φ ∈ L, if M ± CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w by IR. Hence w M C CM w by definition. have all the properties stipulated by the semantic interface of LIiP; this is straightforward and therefore relegated to Appendix A.2.
Corollary 7 (Algorithmic decidability). LIiP is algorithmically decidable.
Proof. In order to algorithmically decide whether or not φ ∈ LIiP (that is, LIiP φ) for some φ ∈ L (and the current choice of M), axiomatic adequacy allows us to check whether or not ¬φ is locally satisfiable (That is, whether or not M, s |= ¬φ for some LIiP-model M and state s. Also, M ∈ cl s CM (∅) on the currently chosen message language M is obviously decidable; for other, more complex message languages including cryptographic messages, see for example [TGD10] and [BRS10] ). But then, the finite-model property of LIiP allows us to enumerate all finite LIiP-models M fin up to a size of at most 2 to the power of the size n of the sub-formula closure of ¬φ and to check whether or not M fin , s |= ¬φ. (First, there are at most 2 n equivalence classes for n formulas. Second, checking intuitionistic negation, which is checking classical negation within the up-set of the state s with respect to , within a finite model is also a finite task.)
Note that the algorithmic complexity of LIiP will depend on the specific choice of M and the correspondingly chosen term axioms.
Conclusion
We have produced LIiP from LiP with as main contributions those described in Section 1.2. In future work, we shall work out dynamic and first-order extensions of LIiP. As roughly related work, we have already mentioned [AI07] (cf. Page 2, 5, 9, and 13) and can further mention [PP13] and [SB13] . In [PP13] , a fragment of an intuitionistic version of the minimal Justification Logic [Art08] (mJL) is introduced in the context of an ambitious Curry-Howard isomorphism for modular programming. A similar appreciation can be made of [SB13] , which introduced an intuitionistic fragment of the Logic of (non-interactive) Proofs (extending mJL) [AI07] . The main contribution of [PP13] as well as [SB13] seems to be a programming calculus for an axiomatically defined intuitionistic modal logic rather than logic itself, whereas ours is an intuitionistic modal logic with an axiomatics and a set-theoretically constructive semantics. 
